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These reflections are inspired by reading Rebecca L. Brown’s
contribution to this Symposium, which is entitled, “Confessions
of a Flawed Liberal.” So since this essay is in some ways an
attempted response, I would like to call it “Aspirations to Liberal
Flawlessness” or just “Toward Flawlessness.”
The question is whether it is a form of apostasy from the lib-
eral creed to think (a) that the Constitution might permit (or
indeed require?) the legal limitation of hate speech, and/or (b)
that federal or state law may constitutionally limit financial con-
tributions and expenditures in electoral campaigns in a signifi-
cant number of instances. It could be argued that both proposi-
tions represent the abandonment of basic liberal positions on the
importance of the broadest possible scope for the freedom of
speech.
Speech and Equality
The basic conceptual problem arises from an apparent contra-
diction between two liberal values. What we seem to confront —
both on the question of hate speech and also on the question of
“money as speech” — is a clash between two sets of values that
most liberals have always held in the highest esteem: on the one
hand, the values of the freedom of speech and on the other hand
the values of equality.
In the history of the Supreme Court these two sets of values
came to maturity at approximately the same time. The Court’s
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the great school deseg-
regation case of 1954,1 brought the theme of equality to the fore-
front of popular, political and scholarly attention for the first
time in the history of the Supreme Court — notwithstanding ear-
lier partial steps in cases involving racially restrictive land
covenants,2 segregation in graduate education,3 and racially
restrictive party primaries.4 (Of course, the Court had long since
turned away from using the equal protection clause to protect
businesses against regulation — by asserting, for example, the
“equality” of manufacturers and agriculturalists — in such cases
as Tigner v. Texas in 1940.5) It is often said that equality was the
principal Leitmotiv of the Warren Court — an assessment that
owes as much to the reapportionment cases, such as Baker v.
Carr6 and Reynolds v. Sims,7 as it does to Brown. But for the
anchoring of equality as a prime liberal achievement of the
Supreme Court, the post-Warren Court development of gender
discrimination jurisprudence — from Reed v. Reed8 to the VMI
case9 — also plays an essential part; and the Court’s recent deci-
sion in Lawrence v. Texas10 may eventually take its place, as
well, in any roll call of the major steps in the liberal jurispru-
dence of equality.
It was only ten years after Brown — in New York Times v.
Sullivan11 in 1964 — that the Supreme Court made absolutely
clear that it was according serious weight to the freedom of
speech as a fundamental constitutional value. This development
was confirmed in 1969 in Brandenburg v. Ohio,12 which drew
together earlier notable contributions by Justices Holmes,
Brandeis and Harlan, and Judge Learned Hand, in order to for-
mulate a test that considerably narrowed the circumstances in
which “inciting” speech could be constitutionally punished.
Slightly later cases like Cohen v. California13 (Harlan again) and
the Pentagon Papers Case14 (Black, Douglas, Brennan — but
not Harlan) represented further confirmation of the central role
that freedom of speech had finally assumed in the jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court.
For liberals, it is an important fact that the decision of New
York Times v. Sullivan marked a majestic moment in which the
values of speech and the values of equality coincided and rein-
forced each other: the speech that was protected in Sullivan was
speech that was directed toward overcoming racial discrimina-
tion. The same thing could be said about several other important
cases of the Civil Rights era, such as NAACP v. Alabama15 and
NAACP v. Button.16
The problems that we face today, in an attempt to secure a
flawless liberalism, arise because these two values perhaps most
prized by liberals — speech and equality — seem to weigh on
separate sides of the scale in a number of contemporary consti-
tutional problems. In hate speech legislation, for example, the
desire to achieve equality in society seems to run contrary to the
broadest protection of speech. And in the context of electoral
regulations, the legislative attempt to avoid gross inequalities
through limiting massive electoral contributions is said to violate
a concept of the freedom of speech that would result in the most
numerous instances of the promulgation of political opinion.
In an attempt to achieve flawlessness, I tend to choose the
speech side on “hate speech” and the equality side on the problems
of electoral regulation. But actually I think that the equality side
on electoral regulation is, at bottom, the speech side as well.
Hate Speech
With respect to hate speech, I tend to favor broad constitu-
tional protection against criminal penalization, because it seems
to me that this sort of legislation fosters an atmosphere of 
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suppression which threatens to go much farther than the suppres-
sion of any specific kind of hate speech that a particular author
of legislation or proponent would want to penalize. Each of us
perhaps has a visceral sense of what sort of hate speech could be
suppressed without endangering “true” speech values; but the
relaxation of speech protections — if
allowed — will not be controlled by
any particular individual, and the risks
of undue extension of the exceptions
are, in my opinion, unduly great.
Moreover, I doubt that the criminal
suppression of hate speech will really
make any significant contribution
toward the achievement of social
equality. I think, rather, that its benefits will be little more than
symbolic, and that its burdens will fall whimsically upon partic-
ularly annoying individuals.17
Sometimes the more vigorous criminalization of hate speech
in the Federal Republic of Germany is cited in favor of a similar
approach in the United States.18 But having observed how some
of these rules work in Germany, I am very skeptical about
whether such constitutional doctrines should be adopted here.
First, let me say that I have no doubt that rules of this kind may
be appropriate for Germany — for obvious historical reasons —
and in this respect I am not a “universalist” in constitutionalism.
But the prohibition of hate speech in Germany is also very
closely connected with a general view of the freedom of speech
that is considerably narrower than anything that American liber-
als would tolerate in the United States. For example, the limita-
tion of hate speech in Germany is closely connected with the
view that extreme political parties and other forms of “extreme”
political speech can also be suppressed. Indeed the German
Constitutional Court did “prohibit” two political parties in the
1950s (including a neo-Nazi party.19 and the historic German
Communist Party in the West20), and the government has tried
(as yet without success) to ban a far right-wing party in recent
years. It may be said that effectively the same thing occurred in
the United States in the 1950s, in the Dennis case among oth-
ers.21 But is this really the kind of model that we would like to
emulate today? 
The German suppression of hate speech is also very closely
connected with a form of constitutional balancing that I think
many American liberals would find particularly unsettling. It is
true that in the last few years many results in the German
Constitutional Court on freedom of speech have approximated
the results that would have been reached in the United States
also; and it may well be that further liberalization is in the wind.
Yet the technique applied by the Constitutional Court — and the
doctrine acknowledged by the Court — would allow the penal-
ization of much political speech that would be protected here.
The current doctrine of the Constitutional Court would, for
example, allow penalization of certain speech on grounds that
come perilously close to what would be viewed as the doctrine
of seditious libel in the United States. For example, it appears
that, under the current doctrine of the Constitutional Court, the
statement “all members of the German
army are murderers or potential mur-
derers” — a provocative and hyper-
bolic remark the likes of which were
commonly heard in the United States
in the Vietnam era — could be subject
to criminal penalization.22
Indeed, as late as the 1970s, the
German Constitutional Court upheld
an injunction against a novel by Klaus Mann (because it suppos-
edly insulted or libeled the well-known actor Gustaf Gründgens,
who was both Mann’s former brother-in-law and a prominent
cultural official under the Nazi regime).23 The Court also
imposed a prior restraint against the showing of a documentary
drama about a terrorist attack on a German Army unit, on the
grounds that the film might interfere with the rehabilitation of a
convicted accomplice in the crime, who had recently been
released from jail.24 In 1980, furthermore, libel damages were
upheld in favor of the writer Heinrich Böll against a TV critic
who had issued a bitter attack against Böll’s writing, on the
grounds that (as Böll claimed) his views were misquoted or cited
out of context.25
Moreover, in more recent German legislation we can see the
perils of such an approach as it specifically relates to hate
speech. In a statute, intended to broaden the criminalization of
Holocaust denial, language was also inserted in order to impose
penalties for denial that German-speaking people had been
expelled from Eastern European countries after the Second
World War.26 If we prohibit the denial of the undeniable, can we
be certain that government will refrain from punishing other
views of history? Do we really want to fight these battles?
Rather, we should have the degree of confidence in our society
that would allow us to protect — as Holmes admonished — even
the thoughts “that we loathe and believe to be fraught with
death.” This is the path of free speech, and I do not think that the
prosecution of an occasional hapless hater — probably a “puny
anonymity” as was Keegstra in Canada27 — will actually move
us in any significant way toward the goal of social justice in a
more egalitarian society.
Electoral Regulation – Money and Speech
On the other hand with respect to the problems of Buckley v.
Valeo and its successors28 — the question of whether Congress
may impose limits on electoral contributions and expenditures —
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I tend to come down on what seems to be the side of equality.
The government ought to be able to regulate the expenditure of
funds in order to achieve a degree of equality or proportionality
in political power. Here I hold with those who emphasize the
equality principle of Reynolds v. Sims.29 In Reynolds, the Court
held that the government may not structure the electoral system
so that particular individuals are granted a substantially higher
degree of voting power than others. The general principle is one
of equality of each individual within the electoral system. As
Deborah Hellman indicates in her essay in this Symposium, we
certainly would not allow a financially strapped state to sell more
extensive voting rights to the highest bidder.
In the same way, it seems to me that the government should
be allowed to act affirmatively to preserve this general principle
of electoral equality — to the extent that it finds it possible to do
so — through the regulation of expenditures that might distort
the effective political power that a particular individual or group
may have. Here it might be said that the values of equality are
being preferred over the values of speech, but I am not sure that
that is really the best way to look at this result. I would prefer to
view limitations on electoral expenditures — which, after all, are
not regulations on the content of speech, but rather regulations of
the circumstances of speech — as more closely analogous to reg-
ulations that might allocate opportunities to speak in a particular
public forum, or might limit overbearing uses of speech, such as
sound trucks, etc.30 Such regulations have always been viewed
as supplementing and protecting the freedom of speech, rather
than impairing it.
Perhaps one could imagine certain egalitarian positions that
might indeed raise substantial free speech concerns. For exam-
ple, some might argue that the government has an obligation
under the First Amendment to provide affirmative support for
the views of “marginalized” groups in certain contexts, in order
to present “ideas and positions otherwise absent from public
discourse.”31 Or, perhaps more radically, it might be asserted
that some minority views deserve special governmental assis-
tance and support to compensate for “false consciousness”
among the citizenry.32
To the extent that these arguments assert that certain views
should be accorded governmental preference because of their
content, the arguments may well run into significant difficulties
under First Amendment doctrine. But I do not believe that sup-
port for congressional limitations on electoral contributions and
expenditures is subject to the same objections. Rather, because
the campaign financing regulations are limits on the amount of
expenditures — and are not intended to provide support for any
particular opinion — I believe that a view of this kind can avoid
the difficulties associated with any argument based on “false
consciousness,” etc.
In any case, I think that if equality in voting power is a funda-
mental aspect of voting, some degree of equality or proportion-
ality in effective political power should also be viewed as an
essential component of the political process -– and therefore of
the effective freedom of speech — as well.33
Peter E. Quint is the Jacob A. France Professor of Constitutional
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